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Abstract
The  equilibrium  set  of housing  units  (alternatives)  can  be  characterized  from  the 
standpoint  of  both  the  demander  and  the  supplier.  The  current  work  describes  an 
application of the  multicriteria single  price  model to the ranking of alternatives.  By a 
generalization of the single price model and from both viewpoints an efficiency index 
can  be  calculated.  We  demonstrate  how,  in  equilibrium,  the  two  viewpoints  result 
inevitably in inverse orders of ranking. The model is illustrated by a sample of housing 
units in the city of Valencia, Spain.2
1. Introduction
Whatever the economic and financial situation at the time, the decision to buy or sell a 
home should be rational, based on clearly defined aims and taking account of all the 
available  market  information.  From  the sellers’  viewpoint, his/her  aim  must  be  to 
maximise the ratio between the sale price and the features and attributes of the property. 
That means obtaining the highest possible price in line with the market, considering the 
property’s area, age, location, etc. On the opposing side, buyers will try to obtain the 
best combination of those variables – subject to  their  personal  preferences – at  the 
lowest price possible.
This being the context, it becomes necessary to identify the features that are relevant to 
price formation and to quantify their respective importance. In the literature, this has 
usually been done by  means of  hedonic price  models  (Rosen,  1974).  The hedonic 
approach views a residential property as a homogeneous possession, but conceptualises 
it as made up of a basket of individual attributes such that each of them contributes to 
providing one or more of the home’s services. Hedonic prices are defined as the implicit 
prices of those attributes of the possession.
Sellers have an interest in knowing whether the price they are asking is or is not above 
the  market  value  of  the  property (obtained from a  set  of  recent  transactions).
Conversely, buyers have an interest in knowing whether the property on offer is being 
overvalued or whether its price is a good market fit. Sometimes there are buyers who 
may  be  willing  to  pay  a  higher  price  based  on  subjective  factors.  Under  this 
circumstance the seller can get a price which is higher than the “objective” market price 
of the property. Furthermore, the role played by investors in search of a real estate 
portfolio should be considered. These are interested in buying and selling, but not at any 
cost: if and only if the transaction cost is reasonable. All sellers, buyers and investors 
seek to know the  “objective”  market  price of the properties,  which depends on  the 
features of the properties. This information is of great interest for housing sellers and 
buyers in the dealing process and can help investors to identify the best investment 
opportunities in the housing market.
To compare and rank dwellings, it is fundamental to establish the weight (valuation) of 
the different attributes that define a property. Considering the most general form of a 3
utility  function,  Ballestero  and  Romero  (1991,  1993)  make  use  of  Compromise 
Programming (Yu, 1973; Zeleny, 1973, 1974) to establish a weighting system in which 
the weight of each attribute is inversely proportional to the difference between its ideal 
value and anti-ideal. The weights are conceptualized as shadow prices and are directly 
applicable on different economic scenarios posed by the same authors (Ballestero and 
Romero, 1994). Among these, noteworthy is the full ranking of organizational units in 
the efficiency models (Ballestero, 1999). A more detailed economic interpretation can 
be found in Ballestero (2002, pages 90-94). The following section also provides a brief 
interpretation of this choice of weights.
The single price  model  (SPM)  of  Ballestero  (1999)  makes  it possible to perform  a 
hierarchy of  the  efficient alternatives,  giving rise  to  what  is k nown  as an efficient 
alternatives ranking. SPM computes a cardinal ranking of the units in a simple way, and 
is  connected  with  an  economic  scenario  where  the  only hypothesis  assumed  is a  
moderate pessimistic attitude towards the decision maker's risk (buyer or seller in our 
context).
It thus offers a possibility that is especially attractive in the field of selling and buying 
residential properties. Suppose an owner decides to put his or her home up for sale, and 
sets a price for it. The seller will not only want to know whether that price undervalues 
the property in comparison with other similar sold properties;  the seller will also want 
to know  what position  his or her  offer occupies  in r elation  to  these properties.  In 
addition, SPM makes it possible to perform a sensitivity analysis of the results and reply 
to questions like, “By how many positions will the ranking of a property change if the 
price  is m odified?”  And  a  similar  analysis  can  be  performed  from  the  buyer’s 
viewpoint.
The  full ranking  of  alternatives  is by  no  means  a  new  question  for  researchers, 
especially  in  the  multicriteria  area.  The  well-known  DEA  (Charnes  et  al.,  1978) 
attempts to distinguish between efficient and non-efficient alternatives, called Decision 
Making Units (DMU), and also to provide useful benchmarks (target projection on the 
efficiency frontier, set of efficient peers). The efficient alternatives are all assigned the 
same efficiency index (EI), namely 1, so that they all have the same priority. Only the 
inefficient alternatives can be differentiated by the EI, which is less than 1 for all of 
them. So DEA is primarily intended to differentiate between inefficient alternatives, but 
not to differentiate between those that are efficient (Ballestero and Maldonado, 2004). 4
Most of the proposals based on DEA to perform a full ranking are reasoned on graphic 
illustration  of  the  DMU’s  on  attributes  axes  (Sexton  et al.,  1986;  Andersen  and 
Petersen, 1993; Sinuany-Stern et al., 1994; Ertay and Ruan, 2005).
However, making a comparison between SPM and DEA is not an objective of this 
study, since the methodologies were conceived under different hypotheses and also for 
different purposes. SPM and other well known multicriteria ranking methods such as 
ELECTRE  (Roy,  1968),  AHP  (Saaty,  1980),  TOPSIS  (Hwang and  Yoon,  1981)  or 
PROMETHEE (Brans et al., 1986) are not comparable either, since the originality of the 
SPM model arises from the relation established between the compromise programming 
and the utility function(Ballestero y Romero, 1991).
The present study proposes the use of SPM for the objective analysis of efficiency and 
the cardinal ranking in decisions governing the buying and selling of goods. With the 
market price of a set of goods and their relevant features as givens, the intent is to arrive 
at the EI of each and build a full ranking of them. SPM has recently been applied 
successfully  to the purchase of capital goods (Talluri,  2002),  to hospital  efficiency 
(Ballestero and Maldonado, 2004), and to selecting textile products (Ballestero, 2004). 
The  novelty of  our proposal  lies  in  its  field of  application, namely the  ranking of 
residential properties, and the double perspective adopted: seller and buyer. Our aim, 
which is to find a model of equilibrium between the expectations of buyers and sellers, 
requires some modification of Ballestero’s original approach. It will be shown how, in a 
situation of equilibrium, the differing perspectives of buyer and seller lead inevitably to 
opposite orders of priority, and that these orders are independent of the decision maker’s 
attitude, whether optimistic or pessimistic. In addition, the weights assigned to each 
criterion are arrived at even more simply than in the original SPM formulation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the 
working of SPM and the connection with a well-known multiple criteria technique: 
Compromise  Programming.  Section  3  describes  the  adaptation  of  the  model  to  a 
situation of equilibrium between suppliers and demanders in a general context. Section 
4 illustrates the foregoing by applying it to a sample of residential properties in the city 
of Valencia, Spain. Finally, there is a section giving our main conclusions.5
2. The single price model
This section intends to provide a summary of the general aspects of the SPM model and 
its relation  to  compromise  programming,  and serves  as a basis  for  the subsequent 
sections.
SPM treats a set of s benefits and compares them to m costs. In order to draw up a 
ranking based on the N initial alternatives, aggregation (1) is proposed:
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where  j Y is the aggregate benefit of the j
th alternative,  j X is the aggregate cost of the j
th
alternative,  ij y is the  i
th benefit of  the  j
th  alternative,  hj x is the h
th cost of  the  j
th
alternative,  with  0  i u and  0  h v being the weights of the i
th benefit and h
th cost
respectively. The problem can now be expressed in terms of how to obtain objectively 
the values of i u and  h v , and for this a two-stage solution is offered.
First Step. Classifying the alternatives into inefficient and non-inefficient
In line with the classic DEA model, an alternative is inefficient if and only if it is 
dominated by a convex combination of other alternatives. Unlike in DEA, the non-
dominated alternatives are treated as non-inefficient instead of as efficient.
Second step: Calculating the EI
In this step, the model constructs the EI (2) from the set of alternatives classified in the 
preceding step as non-inefficient. Building the index requires quantifying weights  i u
and h v in (1). Two assumptions are made for this purpose: 1) the benefits from the non-
inefficient  alternatives  must  cover  their  costs,  and  2)  in  constructing  the  EI,  it  is 
important that the model does not overestimate the difference between benefits and 
costs in a way that favours any particular alternative. Therefore, the assumption is that 
the behaviour of those estimating the benefits from the alternatives will be moderate, 6
since overestimating the benefits of one of them will necessarily entail underestimating 
the others.
In the context of utilitarianism, the benefits, unlike the costs, follow the rule "more is 
better". Transforming the latter so that "more is better", and assigning variables to each 
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Where the following transformations were carried out: 
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Although the difference to best is used in the SPM in order to invert scales, alternative 
approaches to this end can be found in efficiency analysis, that have different impact on 
the dataset ( Seiford and Zhu, 2002).
The efficient frontier is marked by points (8):
) z z z z z (z E m s 1 λ λ 1 - λ 2 1 λ    

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Where  ) min(z z j     denotes the anti-ideal or nadir value and  ) max(z z j     denotes 
the ideal or anchor value in the 
th criterion, as usually referred to in Compromise 
Programming. We must remark that anti-ideal and ideal values are obtained from the 
non-inefficient set of alternatives.
Points (8) are brought into model (3) in the form of constraints:
1 z w z w μ μ μ λ λ   
          m s 2 1 λ   ,..., , (9)7
with m s    1,..., 1, 1,2,...,    . In this way, a linear system of  ) ( m s  equations 
is obtained. The practical justification for including these constraints will be explained 
in the next section.
Using a theorem from Ballestero and Romero (1993), it can be demonstrated that when 
the set of constraints (9) is added to model (3) the solution for w is unique and is given 
by expression (10) independently of the alternative that is under consideration in the 
objective function:
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In this way, the EI of the j
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and from that the ranking of alternatives can be arrived at directly.
As stated in the introduction, the weights  λ w are inversely proportional to the difference 
between the ideal value and the anti-ideal in the criterion λ
th. Figure 1 represents the 
problem in a bicriteria space. Suppose that the criteria follow the rule "more is better", 
and that locus  F  (convex)  is defined  by the set of  non-dominated alternatives.  The 
criteria c1 (c2) has the ideal value  ) ( 2 1
  c c and the anti-ideal   1 c ( ) 2 c . Consequently, the 
ideal point I of coordinates (
 
2 1 c c , ) is located in the non-feasible region. Following 
Zeleny’s axiom of choice, the F alternatives closest to I will be preferable.
Among the different norms that can be used to quantify the distance to I is the infinite 
norm, which is the norm used to represent the L∞ path. The weights, which must hold 
with the equality  ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 c c w c c w   
  are derived specifically from this path. The 
cross point between the boundary F and the L∞ path identifies the feasible alternative 
closest to the ideal I in infinite norm. Point L1 corresponds to the alternative closest to 
the ideal point in norm one. In a bicriteria problem, the application of other norms 
would give rise to other solutions within the segment delimited by L1 and L∞, the so-
called compromise set (Yu, 1973).8
Ballestero and Romero (1991) demonstrate how under the hypothesis of the marginal 
rate of substitution law, any utility function defined on the criteria c1 and c2 reach a 
solution within the compromise set. 
Figure 1. Compromise set in a bicriteria space
3. Full ranking of goods by means of an adapted single price 
model
As stated in the Introduction, this study proposes SPM be used for the objective analysis 
of efficiency in decisions concerning sale and purchase of goods (alternatives). Our 
proposal should be understood to be a generalization of the SPM model, in which the 
viewpoints of both the buyer and the seller, rather than just one of their viewpoints, are 
considered  in the full  ranking of goods. In  our proposal  it  is assumed  that all  the 
decision makers have the same objective preferences so as to exclude the subjectivity of 
the analysis. The exclusion of subjectivity, understood as the individual decision-maker 
preferences, ensures to get a one and only ranking of alternatives. If the perception of 
each criterion is different depending on the particular decision-maker, or the weight of 
the criteria is different for each decision-maker, there will not be an only ranking. In this 
case, the relative position of the alternatives could be modified depending on who is the 
decision-maker. When applying the proposed model, the decision maker must be aware 
of and test the moderate attitude which is assumed to be basic in the model, as well as 
the features of the equilibrium set obtained in each particular application.9
The proposal depends on modifying the original model, and for that we must first give 
some definitions.
Definition 3.1: Good non-inefficient for the buyer
A good is to be considered non-inefficient from the buyer’s viewpoint if there is no 
convex combination of goods that would have a lower or equal price with a higher or 
equal level of features.
Definition 3.2: Good non-inefficient for the seller
A good is to be considered non-inefficient from the seller’s viewpoint if there is no 
convex combination of goods that would have a higher or equal price with a lower or 
equal level of features.
Definition 3.3: Equilibrium set
Given a set of goods whose sale/purchase price is known and a vector of features that 
are relevant to the valuation of the goods, then the equilibrium set of goods is composed 
of those that are non-inefficient from the viewpoint of both the buyer and the seller.
It can be seen that definition 3.3 makes a good deal of sense economically speaking. If 
the goods in a set S all possess the same features but different prices, then the dearest of 
them, A, is non-inefficient for the seller, while the least expensive of them, B, is non-
inefficient  for  the  buyer.  However,  neither  of  them  will  likely  be chosen  for  the 
transaction. In that set, good A will be the choice of the seller but the least attractive to 
buyers. The same reasoning can be applied to good B, with the result that neither of 
them will end up being sold. In fact, no other good in set S is likely to change hands if 
the market is transparent, because both sellers and buyers can find better alternatives 
within the same set. Consequently, the equilibrium set will contain only those goods 
that are equally attractive to both buyer and seller, that is to say non-inefficient from 
both points of view. In other words, the assumption is that a sale is only likely to be 
transacted when neither buyer nor seller can find a more efficient alternative. If the data 
set only comprises already sold goods, and not a combination of offered and demanded 
goods, then the reason why A and B should be excluded from the equilibrium set is also 
clear: we wouldhave alternatives with similar features but with a different price, which 
in  a transparent  market  might  imply that (i)  some  relevant criteria  have  not been 
considered or that (ii) the perception of some of these criteria is different depending on 
the buyer/seller which take part on the transaction. This would fail to fulfil the non-10
subjectivity assumption previously remarked. In this situation, both A and B should be 
excluded from the equilibrium set.
First step: Determining the equilibrium set of goods
The buyer seeks to maximise the ratio between the utility of the features in the vector of 
features of the good and the offering price, while the seller does the opposite. To put it 
in the terminology of efficiency analysis, for the buyer the price acts as the single cost
(what the buyer gives) and the features of the good as the different benefits (what the 
buyer receives), and vice versa for the seller. Take  ij c as the value of the i
th feature of 
the j
th good and j p as the price of the j
th good, then the equilibrium set of goods is 
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A good is deemed non-inefficient if the objective function takes value 1, and inefficient 
otherwise. Essentially, a good will be non-inefficient if it is non-inefficient both for the 
buyer and the seller. Consequently, model (12) simply includes the buyer and seller 
models in a single mathematical programming model.
The computing cost entailed in this step is O(N).
Second step: Full ranking of the goods11
The second step only treats the goods constituting the equilibrium set from the first step. 
One of the difficulties in applying SPM in this step is the need to distinguish between 
costs and benefits. The problem arises because what is a cost for the buyer is a benefit
for the seller; and vice versa, what the seller sees as a cost the buyer considers as a 
benefit. Nevertheless, Proposition 3.1 below demonstrates that the criteria weights are 
independent  of  whether  the  criterion  is cost or  benefit.  This  makes  it  possible  to 
implement the second step by means of a model that is even simpler than the proposal 
of Ballestero (1999).
Proposition 3.1: The weight of a criterion is independent of whether the criterion is 
considered a cost or a benefit.
Suppose  a  set  of  s benefits corresponding  to  m costs.  In  SPM,  the  constraint 
corresponding to the fictitious alternatives  1 z w z w μ
μ
μ λ λ   
  generates the following 
set of equations:
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Take  s v  and  s - v  h .  Applying  a trivial  transformation  on  the  original  criteria 
results necessarily in:
      
 )] x (x ) x [(x w ) z (z w max h  max h  min h  max h  v v v v
                       ) x (x w min h  max h  v   (14)
Thus, (12) can be expressed as a function of the  m s  original criteria:







                   (15)
with  ) ij i max(y y 
 ,  ) ij i min(y y   ,  ) hj h max(x x 
 , and  ) hj h min(x x   . 
Expression (15) provides the same solution as (10), if we perform the transformations 
1..s i λ, for y z ij λj   and  1..m h m, 1..s s λ for x x z hj max h  λj       .  Thus  it  is
demonstrated that the weights are independent of whether a specific criterion is a costor 
a benefit.
Corollary 3.1: The EI regarded from the buyer’s viewpoint is inversely proportional to 
the EI from the seller’s viewpoint.12
Suppose without loss of generality that price is the first criterion and that the m features 
influencing the price occupy the next following positions. Then the EI on the seller’s 
side can be calculated by (16):
hj
1 m
2 h h j 1 j x w y w seller EI 

  (16)
while the buyer’s side index requires expression (17):
j 1 hj h
1 m
2 h j y w x w buyer EI 

  (17)
Resulting from Proposition 3.1, and given that the equilibrium set is the same for both 
sides, the weights of each criterion are likewise identical for both buyer and seller. It 
follows that expression (17) is the exact inverse of (16). This relationship only holds if 
the second step is applied to the goods in the equilibrium set and not to the two sets of 
non-efficient goods that would result from taking the viewpoints of buyer and seller 
separately.
Definition 3.4: Moderate pessimism (Ballestero, 2002)
A moderately pessimistic decision maker is one who assumes conservatively that the 
most favourable in a set of possibilities is not the one that will ultimately take place 
(without making conjectures as to the other possibilities).
This is a key definition in the SPM approach, as was indicated previously. Including the 
set of fictitious alternatives that make up the system of equations (9) –called a marginal 
set in  Ballestero  (2002)  – is clearly  justifiable  on  practical  grounds.  It  deals  with 
alternatives that have extreme values for their criteria (the highest value for one of the 
criteria, the lowest value for the rest), which makes them less attractive than other, 
better-balanced criteria. Ballestero (2002) shows that this constraint makes the non-
inefficient alternatives attain values greater than unity; that is, they are preferable to the 
fictitious alternatives. The fictitious alternatives are all assigned a value of 1, so that 
they are all equally preferable for a moderately pessimistic decision-maker. The equal 
ranking for these alternatives is not followed by other MCDA approaches, as swing 
weights in MAUT models, that explicitly ask the decision maker to compare and rank 
such  alternatives. Nevertheless, since our main  objective  is t o get  a one and only
ranking of the alternatives, this ranking can not dependon the individual preferences of 
a single buyer/seller. This would mean, in the most extreme case, to have as many
rankings as buyers or sellers.
Let the set of alternatives be the following:
] , ... , , ... , , [    
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
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Presented with this set, an extreme pessimist would only consider a single alternative, 
the one consisting of the worst values for the criteria. A moderately pessimistic decision 
maker admits the possibility that one criterion may reach the highest possible value 
while the others take the minimum value. Taking this moderately pessimistic approach, 
let  us compare,  without  loss of generality,  alternatives 1 a and  2 a .  It  follows  from 
definition 3.4 that a decision maker would set aside the first and second criteria,  1 z and 
2 z , because they are the most favourable to alternatives  1 a and 2 a respectively. In this 
way, the two alternatives would be composed of the remaining criteria, and they would 
be (i) indistinguishable from one another, with values ] , ... , [    m s 3 z z for the criteria, 
for which reason they can all be assigned the same ranking (e.g., a value of 1); and (ii) 
because they  have  the  worst  possible  values  for  their  criteria,  they would  be less 
preferable than any of the non-fictitious alternatives.
Although the moderately pessimistic attitude was originally introduced by Ballestero in 
order to deal with the problem of the choice of alternatives under uncertain scenarios 
(Ballestero, 2002), later the same author applied it in a multicriteria context (Ballestero, 
2004). Let us reflect on the existing link between both approaches, since a priori they 
might seem to be in conflict. As mentioned before, to rank a set of alternatives it is 
necessary  to quantify  the  weight  of  each  of  the  criteria  which  take  part  in  the 
determination of their EI. Without loss of generality and from the seller’s point of view: 
given an initial set  of goods, suppose the seller decides  to compare the  i a and  j a
alternatives, in such a way that   i a exhibits the greatest value over  j a in the  i z criteria, 
and  j a exhibits the greatest value over  i a in the  j z criteria. Hence,  i z and  j z are the 
most favourable criteria for  i a and  j a , respectively. When comparing both alternatives, 
the moderately pessimistic seller will be sceptical about the relevance of criteria  i z and 
j z . In fact, believing that the criteria for which his/her property gets the greatest value 14
are the most relevant in the market is typical of an optimistic seller, not of a moderately 
pessimistic one. Therefore, the decision-maker fears that alternative  i a ( j a ) will not be 
so lucky as it would be the case if its most favourable criteria were the most relevant to 
the market (Ballestero, 2004, p. 148).
When Definition 3.4 states that the most favourable in a set of possibilities is not the 
one that will ultimately take place, it means that this possibility will not be considered 
by the moderately pessimistic decision-maker when taking his/her decision.
Definition 3.5: Moderate optimism
A moderately optimistic decision maker assumes that the most unfavourable of a set of 
possibilities is not the one that will ultimately take place (without making conjectures 
about the other possibilities).
Given this attitude, the decision maker would consider as fictitious alternatives those 
that have only a single criterion at its lowest value and all the rest at their highest value 
(19):
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Like the moderate pessimists, the moderate optimists would compare any two fictitious 
alternatives, and because of their attitude they would eliminate the attributes with the 
lowest value. Let the two alternatives again be  1 a and 2 a . When criteria  1 z and 2 z are 
removed, the alternatives are composed of the same maximum values in the rest of the 




m s 3 z z . Unlike for the moderate pessimist, for the moderate optimist 
the fictitious alternatives represent better options than the non-fictitious alternatives; 
from which it follows that if the former are allocated unity as index of efficiency, the 
latter are bound to take lower values.15
Proposition 3.2: The approaches of the moderate pessimist and the moderate optimist 
generate the same vector of criterion weights.
In the previous section, it was set forth that the solution to the second step in the full 
ranking process  was provided by  the system  of  equations  associated  with  fictitious 
alternatives  1 z w z w
μ
μ μ λ λ   
 , with  m s 2 1   , ... , ,  .
Extrapolating the system to alternatives (19), it is easy to deduce the same solution (10) 
for the weights.
To sum up, the criteria weights are independent not only of whether the decision makers 
are sellers or buyers, but also of whether  they have an optimistic or  a pessimistic 
attitude. The weights remain constant provided the decision makers maintain a moderate 
attitude in line with definitions 3.4 and 3.5.
4. Case study
For a practical application of the model expounded in the previous section, a database 
was built of properties in the city of Valencia, Spain, compiled from data provided by a 
major Spanish valuation company (TABIMED). The information relates to transactions 
carried out during the second half of 2007.
The model could also be applied to a data base of offered houses; however, in this case,
differences  between  seller  and  buyer  points  of  view  should  be  considered  as  a 
limitation.  While housing price is real for the seller, in the sense that he or she shows 
the willingness to sell the dwelling at the offered price, the same does not occur forthe 
buyer. Price just will be real for the buyer when he/she comes to a deal with the seller 
about the transaction. In Spain, for example, the final price is estimated to be anaverage 
of 5% lower than the offered one.  However, when the data base is only comprised by 
sold housings, like in our case study, prices have been agreed to by sellers and buyers;
hence, they could be considered real prices for both sides.
In this case study the variables can be grouped into three categories:
I.  Variables at  individual  property  level:  price  (in  Euros),  usable  space  (in  square 
metres), number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, area of the balcony or terrace (in 
square metres), floor on which the property is located, quality of construction (on a 
scale of 1 to 5).16
II. Variables at entire building level: number of storeys, lift (a binary no/yes variable), 
age (in years).
III.  Environmental variables:  urban  environment  quality  (scaled  from  1  to  4), 
commercial environment variable (1 to 3), income level (rising from 1 to 3).
The variable ‘orientation’ was removed from those provided by the valuers because it 
turned  out  not  to  be  statistically significant  for  explaining  price.  The  qualitative 
variables were determined according to the criterion of ‘better if more valuable’, and 
were assessed by the whole team of valuers assigned by the firm to the city of Valencia. 
For example, to assess the value of the urban environment on a scale of 1 to 4, the 
valuers  took  account  of  a  series  of  factors:  local  district  communications  (bus, 
underground, tram), green spaces and recreation areas, distance from the city centre and 
other important places in the town, good maintenance of road and pavement surfaces, 
lighting, cleaning, historic importance, and so on.
Before  applying  the  models,  it  was  necessary  to  transform  some  of  the  original 
variables. For instance, the variables ‘number of bedrooms’ and ‘number of bathrooms’ 
were  replaced  by  the  ratios  ‘area/number  of  bedrooms’  and  ‘number  of 
bathrooms/number of bedrooms’ respectively. The reason for the change in the first 
case was that if two properties have exactly the same area, the one with larger bedrooms 
is valued more highly. The second ratio was introduced for a similar reason: the number 
of bathrooms cannot be valued in absolute terms but only relative to the number of 
bedrooms.
In  order  to  limit  the  number  of  properties  analysed  and  ensure  a  minimum  of
homogeneity throughout the sample, they have been taken only from the areas with 
postcodes 46010, 46020, 46021, 46022 and 46023. These are areas that are close to one 
another  and,  most  importantly,  they  share  a  similar  degree  and  type  of  urban 
development. Table 1 is a compilation of the principal statistics for all the properties in 
the sample.
Table 1. Basic statistics of the variables measured in the sample
Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
deviation
Price (euro) 150,000 590,000 259,730.6 91,438.6
Usable area (sq m) 55 176 100.0 23.2
Ratio  area  /  number  of 
bedrooms
20 77 34.0 8.817
Ratio bathrooms / bedrooms 0 1 0.5 0.2
Balcony or terrace area (sq m) 0 80 0.9 6.3
Ratio floor / number of storeys 0 1 0.6 0.3
Construction quality (1-5) 1 5 2.0 0.9
Lift (0/1) 0 1 0.8 0.4
Age (years) 0 77 17.7 12.2
Urban environment quality (1-
4)
1 4 2.2 0.6
Commercial  environment 
quality (1-3)
1 3 2.2 0.4
Income level (1-3) 1 3 1.6 0.7
Applying the first step described above produced a total of 32 non-inefficient properties.  
Their characteristics are shown in Table 2.
At the second stage, the adapted SPM (see Section 3) was applied to the previously 
mentioned set  of  properties.  It  follows  from  Proposition  3.1  that  calculating these 
weights does not require transforming the criteria which act as cost, and the result is 
invariant with respect to the viewpoint adopted (seller or buyer) and to whether the 
decision maker has an optimistic or pessimistic outlook. All that is required is that the 
decision maker’s attitude be moderate. The last column of Table 2 shows the weights 
that result from applying expression (10) on the original criteria.













z all  the  criteria  would  have the  same  unit  weight,  which 
simplifies the mathematical expressions maintaining the same results as in the initial 
focus in which the weights are calculated based on the original criteria.
The possibility  that the introduction  of a new alternative might  change  the  relative 
position of the rest of the alternatives should be pointed out. For example, if the price of 
the new alternative is lower than the minimum price in the current set of alternatives, 
the relative ranking of the other alternatives may be modified. Nevertheless, this is a 
problem shared with other methodologies for the ranking of alternatives.
The  EI  for  each property has been calculated  from  either  expression  (16)  or  (17) 
according to whether it is being done from the seller’s or buyer’s viewpoint, and it is 
listed in columns 14 and 15 of Table 2.18
Because the weight that results for the price (5.1176E-07) is relatively low compared to 
the rest of the criteria, it might be thought that the model is undervaluing this variable 
despite the fact that it can be considered the most important for practical purposes and 
sums  up  all  the  information  in the  other criteria. To  test  this hypothesis,  the  linear 
correlation coefficient was calculated between the EI for the seller and each of the 
criteria, and it was observed that the highest value is precisely that of price (92.7%), 
followed by area (68.2%), lift (51.7%) and age (-46.8%). Similar values have been 
obtained from the buyer’s viewpoint but with the opposite sign, as was to be expected 
from what was stated in Corollary 3.1. This constitutes confirmation of the hypothesis 
that price is the most pertinent variable for calculating the efficiency index of properties.
With the aim of comparing and contrasting differences with other known full ranking 
methods, the EI of the housings which comprise the equilibrium set has been calculated 
by means of the cross-efficiency analysis (Sexton et al., 1986), both in its aggressive
and  benevolent versions.  The  aggressive  (benevolent)  version seeks  to  minimize 
(maximize)  the  efficiency  of  the  population  of  the  DMUs  while  maintaining  the 
efficiency  of  the  DMU  under  consideration  fixed  (Ertay  and  Ruan,  2005). One 
important difference between the  SPM and the cross-efficiency analysis is the different 
treatment for the criteria weights: in the SPM this weights are  invariable with respect to 
the analyzed DMU, while with the  cross-efficiency analysis  the weights can differ 
from one DMU to other.
Results from the cross-efficiency analysis application appear in the last columns of the 
table2. Although in the SPM model the EI from both the buyer and the seller point of 
view are directly related, the same thing does not occur in the cross-efficiency analysis, 
due to the different weights obtained for the criteria in each DMU. In the aggressive 
version,  the  correlation  coefficient  between  both  EI is  of -50.9%,  while  in  the 
benevolent version the correlation is of -74.2%. In our opinion, the use of the same 
weights for the criteria, independently of the decision-maker is the buyer or the seller, 
and independently of the analyzed housing, is a SPM model advantage. This makes 
possible the EI for the buyer to be the inverse of the EI for the seller. In other words, to 
consider that what is good for the seller is no good for the buyer, and vice versa. This 
hypothesis is not supported when the correlation coefficient between the EI of the buyer 
and the seller one distances from the -100%, like in the case of the cross-efficiency 
analysis applied to the two studied versions. 19
Table 2. Information relating to non-inefficient properties and their EIs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
1 590,000 130.0 5 3 43.33 0.67 1.00 1 0 4 3 10 0.122 8.224 0.546 0.383 0.913 0.469
2 583,000 167.0 2 3 41.76 0.50 0.44 1 0 3 3 26 0.137 7.303 0.581 0.334 0.941 0.408
4 535,000 120.0 5 3 60.00 1.00 0.31 1 0 4 3 5 0.112 8.903 0.544 0.385 0.878 0.484
5 527,748 143.0 3 3 47.67 0.67 0.83 1 0 2 3 5 0.123 8.151 0.573 0.357 0.863 0.441
6 526,054 138.2 3 1 46.08 0.67 0.77 1 0 4 3 0 0.130 7.684 0.685 0.352 0.892 0.454
7 525,000 93.0 2 1 31.00 0.67 1.00 1 20 2 1 3 0.154 6.476 0.183 0.275 0.840 0.335
8 520,000 135.0 5 3 45.00 0.67 0.17 1 0 4 3 10 0.117 8.555 0.531 0.401 0.841 0.504
10 500,000 170.0 2 2 42.50 0.50 0.75 1 0 2 2 28 0.129 7.739 0.504 0.375 0.811 0.457
15 475,000 132.0 5 3 33.00 0.75 0.33 1 0 2 3 10 0.114 8.761 0.506 0.407 0.788 0.499
52 350,000 113.1 1 3 37.70 0.67 0.88 1 0 3 3 50 0.079 12.652 0.401 0.519 0.673 0.556
65 339,500 80.0 2 3 40.00 0.50 1.00 1 0 2 2 16 0.091 10.990 0.426 0.455 0.719 0.514
66 336,567 78.6 4 2 39.30 0.50 0.71 1 0 3 2 0 0.094 10.617 0.539 0.483 0.693 0.594
78 320,640 80.0 1 3 40.00 0.50 1.00 1 0 2 2 20 0.088 11.403 0.444 0.453 0.723 0.501
125 271,066 70.8 2 2 23.59 0.33 1.00 1 0 3 3 9 0.077 12.983 0.388 0.546 0.621 0.626
131 264,445 60.7 4 2 60.68 1.00 0.71 1 0 3 2 0 0.066 15.151 0.427 0.604 0.573 0.732
157 243,636 77.5 2 1 25.83 0.33 0.33 1 0 4 3 9 0.078 12.900 0.365 0.562 0.578 0.683
165 240,000 113.0 2 3 56.50 0.50 0.33 0 0 3 3 32 0.064 15.590 0.484 0.660 0.737 0.786
180 230,400 126.0 1 1 42.00 0.33 0.50 0 0 2 2 20 0.088 11.364 0.576 0.541 0.796 0.690
188 226,000 81.0 4 2 27.00 0.33 0.75 0 0 3 2 35 0.070 14.383 0.473 0.718 0.754 0.828
210 213,000 103.0 1 3 51.50 0.50 0.22 0 0 3 3 32 0.061 16.354 0.505 0.653 0.759 0.768
222 205,000 142.7 1 2 28.55 0.40 0.56 1 0 2 2 45 0.059 17.076 0.253 0.806 0.390 0.915
284 180,000 64.0 4 1 64.00 1.00 0.25 1 23 2 3 0 0.044 22.782 0.074 0.834 0.295 1.000
308 167,516 61.0 1 1 20.32 0.33 1.00 0 0 1 1 9 0.086 11.606 0.611 0.522 0.853 0.621
314 165,000 62.1 2 3 31.05 0.50 0.67 0 0 3 3 44 0.046 21.624 0.388 0.876 0.655 0.924
321 161,900 67.0 1 2 22.33 0.33 1.00 1 0 2 3 30 0.047 21.122 0.247 0.851 0.405 0.878
324 161,178 64.0 2 1 32.00 0.50 0.22 1 0 2 2 9 0.060 16.600 0.266 0.691 0.423 0.820
333 157,000 78.0 1 1 19.50 0.25 1.00 0 0 3 2 35 0.058 17.181 0.428 0.800 0.664 0.899
335 156,000 60.0 2 1 30.00 0.50 0.60 0 0 2 3 30 0.056 17.975 0.426 0.739 0.723 0.808
341 151,050 90.0 1 1 22.50 0.25 0.33 0 0 2 2 20 0.070 14.197 0.486 0.667 0.696 0.820
342 151,000 70.0 2 1 23.33 0.33 0.40 0 0 2 2 8 0.070 14.313 0.521 0.657 0.723 0.82620
344 150,000 67.0 1 3 33.50 0.50 0.80 0 0 3 3 40 0.042 23.580 0.371 0.915 0.610 0.971
345 150,000 90.0 1 2 22.50 0.50 1.00 0 0 2 2 35 0.050 19.968 0.375 0.868 0.562 0.964
j w 5.1176E-07 0.00205 0.05629 0.11258 0.00506 0.30022 0.27020 0.22516 0.00979 0.07505 0.11258 0.00450
Legend:
(1) Property identification number. (2)  1 y - Sale transaction price. (3)  1 x - Usable area. (4)  2 x - Construction quality on a scale of 1-5. (5)  3 x -
Income level on a scale of 1-3. (6)  4 x - Ratio usable space / number of bedrooms. (7)  5 x - Ratio number of bathrooms / number of bedrooms. (8) 
6 x - Ratio floor where the property is situated / number of storeys in the building. (9)  7 x -  Lift. (10)  8 x - Balconyor terrace area. (11)  9 x - Urban 
environment quality on a scale of 1-4. (12)  10 x - Commercial environment quality on a scale of 1-3. (13)  11 x - Age. (14) EI from seller’s 
viewpoint in SPM. (15) EI from buyer’s viewpoint in SPM. (16) EI from seller’s viewpoint with the aggressive version of cross-efficiency. (17) 
EI from buyer’s viewpoint with the aggressive version of cross-efficiency. (18) EI from seller’s viewpoint with the benevolent version of cross-
efficiency. (19) EI from buyer’s viewpoint with the benevolent version of cross-efficiency.
N.B. The classification of variables as cost (x ) or benefit ( y) has been done from the seller’s viewpoint. To change to the buyer’s viewpoint, it 
is only necessary to invert the notation.21
5. Conclusions
This study reports an application of the single price model to the ranking of alternatives 
or  goods  in a  s cenario  where  multiple  sellers  and  buyers  are  considered,  and  an 
application to the residential market is presented. By making a slight adaptation of the 
original model from Ballestero (1999), the equilibrium set of goods is characterised for 
seller and buyer, and from that the EI is calculated.
The model used has a number of advantages over other methods for making a full 
ranking  of  a  set  of  efficient  alternatives.  It  is  a  model  based  on  Compromise 
Programming, has a robust axiomatic basis; and when it calculates the weights of each 
attribute,  it  assumes  that  the  decision  maker  has a  moderate  attitude.  The  study 
demonstrates that  in  the  model put  forward  (i)  the  weights assigned  to each  of  the 
criteria are independent of whether the decision maker is the seller or the buyer, and this 
simplifies calculating the EI; (ii) the EI for the seller is inversely proportional to that for 
the buyer –something which makes good economic sense–; (iii) the calculation of cost
and/or benefit weights coincides no matter whether the decision makers are optimistic 
or  pessimistic,  provided  that  in  either  case  they  maintain  a  moderate  attitude. 
Furthermore, the weights of each criterion are independent of the good valued, and 
determining  them  does  not  carry  a  high  computing  cost.  Indeed  the  model’s 
implementation in two steps has a cost that increases only linearly with the number of 
goods analysed. The EI obtained by using this model not only makes it possible to rank 
the goods in an ordinal way, it also evaluates differences by cardinality.
Finally, the proposed model has been illustrated by taking a broad sample of residential 
properties in the city of Valencia and observing that price is by far the most significant 
variable for calculating the EI.22
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